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RIOS-PINEDA, et ux Federal/Civil Timely 
1. SUMMARY: The CA ordered the Board of Immigration 
Appeals to reopen resps' deportation proceedings, even though 
resps had obtained the seven years of continuous presence 
necessary to suspend deportation only by filing appeals and --. -motions of questionable merit. 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: Resps, who are husband and 
wife, are ~ and citizens of Mexico. They entered this 




husband, Bernardo, had already been forced to return to Mexico 
once under threat of deportation. Bernardo was again 
apprehended. The INS allowed him to leave voluntarily rather 
than be deported, but when he failed to do so it instituted 
deportation proceedings against both resps. At the hearing, 
resps conceded deportability but requested relief on the ground 
that they had one citizen child and were expecting a second. The 
judge treated the request as one for suspension of deportation 
~--------------------------under 8 u.s.c. 1254(a) (1). That section allows suspenion of 
deportation for aliens who have been continuously present in the 
Untied State for seven years and are of good moral character, and 
for whom deportation would constitute extreme hardship. The 
immigration judge held that resps were ineligible because they 
had not attained the necessary 7 years of continuous physical 
~ presence. In light of resps' illegal entry into the country, the 
~udge also refused to allow voluntary departure. He ordered 
resps deported. 
h ~ d f . . . T e Boar o Imm1grat1on Appeals aff1rmed. It held that 
deportation, which would result in the de facto deportation of 
resps' citizen child, did not violate the child's consititutional 
rights. It also rejected a 5th Amendment challenge to the 
proceedings before the Immigration Judge. 
Resps then filed a petn for review in CAS, renewing the 
constitutional cl~ rejected by the BIA. Without addressing 
those claims, the CA noted that resps had satisfied the seven 
years requirement while the petn for review was pending. 




payment on a house and now had [ t_wo ~itize.n ~ldrer. It 
concluded that resps had made a substantial showing that they 
should be afforded relief on the basis of evidence not available 
at the time of the intitial hearing. The court directed the BIA 
to hold the proceedings in abeyance for 60 days to allow resps to 
file a motion to reopen, instructing it to "give careful and 
thorough consideration to the motion to reopen if, indeed, one is 
filed." 
Not surprisingly, a motion to reopen was forthcoming. The 
BIA denied the motion and reaffirmed its earlier ruling. First, 
the motion was not properly filed in a timely manner. Second, 
resps had failed to make a prima facie showing of extreme 
hardship. They had submitted only vague allegations of counsel, 
unspported by affidavits. Finally, the motion should in any 
event be denied in the exercise of the Board's discretion because 
resps "were able to acquire 7 years of physical presence and the 
additional equity of a second child only by filing what we 
consider to be frivolous appeals," and had shown "disregard for 
our immigration laws -by paying a smuggler to help them avoid 
inspec;>on and by failing to depart voluntarily." 
vtA8 again reversed and remanded, this time with explicit 
instructions to the BIA to reopen. First, the motion had been 
timely. Second, the CA had implicitly decided in its first 
decision that resps had made out a prima facie case of extreme 
hardship; that was now the law of the case. Third, the BIA had 
in any event abused its discretion in finding that resps' had 




that Bernardo's mother, who lives in Mexico, was dependent on 
resps, and that their children spoke only English. The Board's 
failure to take these factors into account was an abuse of 
discretion. Finally, the Board abused its discretion in stating 
that it would not reopen the proceeedings even if resps were 
considered to have made out a prima facie case of eligibility. 
Assuming that the Board has discretion to deny a motion to reopen 
even if the prima facie case has been made, it abused that 
discretion here. Resps' appeals had not been "frivolous." And 
the Board erred in relying on resps' "disregard" of the 
immigration laws, for "such disregard is necessarily present in 
some form in most deportation proceedings." These were "improper 
and irrelevant" factors that should not have been considered. 
3. CONTENTIONS: 1. The ultimate relief sought by resps 
(suspension of deportation) and the means of obtaining it (a 
motion to reopen deportation proceedings) are designed to deal 
with the extraordinary situation. This Court has consistently 
recognized the~eadth of the AG's discretion in deciding whether 
to reopen proceedings. See INS v. Phinpathya, 52 USLW 4027, 4029 
n. 6 ("granting of the motion [to reopen] is entirely within 
BIA's discretion"); INS v. wang, 450 u.s. 139, 143-144, and n. 5 
(1981). The decision below impermissibly restricts this 
discretionary authority. 
2. The factors relied on by the BIA in exercising its 
discretion to deny the motion to reopen regardless of whether the 
prima facie case of eligibility had been made out were not 





characterized as frivolous by the Board. The relief obtained as 
a result of the appeals was solely attributable to the delay they 
caused. The CA has essentially said that any litigation that 
buys seven years' presence is not frivolous and that delay is a 
valid purpose for pursuing administrative and judicial review. 
Resps' disregard for the immigration laws is also a relevant 
factor. The fact that all deportable aliens have violated those 
laws to some extent does not mean that the BIA, in exercising its 
discretion, may not differentiate on the basis of the degree to 
which they have flouted the immigration process. 
3. The CA's restriction on the AG's discretionary authority 
to deny motions to reopen will have serious adverse effects on 
the administration of the immigration laws. Aliens will be 
encouraged to file frivolous motions and appeals. This will 
impose a substantial burden on agency resources. It is 
inconceivable that an alien's prolonged and willful abuse of the 
immigration process is an impermissible basis for denying the 
alien's request for discretionary relief. 
4. Petr considers the ruling that resps had established a 
prima facie showing of eligibility to be manifestly incorrect and 
contrary to Wang, which took the CA to task for finding hardship 
even though "the allegations were in the main conclusory and 
unsupported by affidavit." 450 u.s., at 143. It does not raise 
this point as a separate question, however, since reversal of the 
decision of the overall discretion issue would render the prima 





4. DISCUSSION: Petr's strongest argument is the one it 
chooses not to pursue: that the CA erred in ruling that the prima 
facie showing of hardship had been made. That determination is 
within the AG's discretionary authority. In this regard, the 
I decision below is clearly contrary to Wang. 
The issue that petr does raise -- whether the BIA abused its 
discretion in denying the motion to reopen even assuming a prima 
facie case of hardship had been made1 -- is less clear, but the 
CA's decision has little support. Indeed, since the motion to 
re~s a creature of regulation, and this Court has deferred 
to the regulations before, the CA was not really in a position to 
force the BIA to reopen proceedings when it did not want to. The 
decision below also seems inconsistent with the dicta in Wang and 
Phinpathya, with the general trend of the Court's immigration 
decisions, and with a number of other CAs. See, e.g., LeBlanc v. 
INS, 715 F.2d 685 (CAl 1983) (Board may deny reopenings as a 
matter of discretion, "little room for substantive judicial 
review," alien's submission of frivolous motions and refusal to 
1There is a possible conflict as to whether the BIA has 
discretion to refuse to reopen deportation proceedings if the 
alien has made a prima facie showing of eligibility. In Wang and 
in another case the same day, CA9 held that it did not. CAl has 
held that it does. E. g., LeBlanc v. INS, 715 F.2d 685, 692 (CAl 
1983). It seems unlikely that the CA9 ruling survives this 
Court's reversal in Wang. See Augustin v. INS, 700 F.2d 564, 566 
(CA9 1983) ("The Board need not consider statutory eligibility if 
the alien's application would have been properly denied as a 
matter of administrative discretion.") The court below treated 
this as an open question, and assumed that the Board did have the 





depart voluntarily support refusal); Augustin v. INS, 700 F.2d 
564 (CA9 1983) (dilatory tactics); Balani v. INS, 669 F.2d 1157 
(CA6 1982); Pang Kiu v. INS, 663 F.2d 417 (CA2 1981); Lam Chuen 
Ching v. INS, 467 F.2d 644 (CA2 1972) (rejecting "the amazing 
argument ... that because through the delaying tactics employed 
for appellant he was able to prevent his clearly rightful 
deportation for more than four years is a factor favorable to 
him"). 
Although the decision below is fairly dubious under this 
Court's precedents, it is not clear that the petn is certworthy. 
At present, this is a rather narrow controversy. CA8 and the BIA 
have locked horns over resps, but there is no indication that 
this is part of an ongoing struggle. To the contrary, the cases 
cited above indicate that petr generally enjoys the the most 
cooperative review from the CAs. CA8 acknowledged the Board's 
discretion, it only held that in this case it was abused. It 
~
seems that CA8 would agree that bad faith delaying tactics 
including frivolous appeals -- should not entitle an illegal 
alien to take advantage of the 7-years presence provision. It 
just did not think those tactics were used here (a proposition 
with which petr strongly disagrees). Petr, on the other hand, is 
not arguing that the 7-year period is somehow tolled during the 
pendency of all legal proceedings. Thus, the legal disagreement 
is somewhat hard to pin down. (There is a clear disagreement 
over whether an alien's disregard for the immigration laws can be 
held against him.) Moreover, petr's claims of disruption of the 
administration of the immigration laws are pro forma, and are 
I 
-8-
belied by the deference accorded the Board in other CAs. It may 
be that the Court can let this go for now and see if the decision 
• has any continuing significance. 
At the least, there is a stark conflict between the 
executive and the judicial branches over the extent of the AG's 
discretion in this case. A response is certainly in order. 
5. RECOMMENDATION: I recommend CFR. 
There is no response. 
August 13, 1984 Herz Opinion in petn 
lgs November 8, 1984 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 83-2032 - INS v. Rios-Pineda 
This case was originally scheduled for the September 
24, 1984 Conference and was relisted pending receipt of a 
response, which i~ now in hand. The case involved a couple, 
illegal aliens, who through a series of frivolous appeals and 
delaying tactics, succeeded in remaining in this country for 
~~-------------------~--------------
seven years. CA8 then held that because they had stayed the 
statutory length of time, they were entitled to remain. It paid 
only lip service to the Board of Immigration Appeals' discretion 
not to reopen a deportation suit. The INS petitioned for cert, 
and resps have now responded. 
In a mostly irrelevant and incoherent brief~ resps 
argue primarily that the petn should be denied because it is 
jurisdictionally out of time. They contend that the issue raised 
in the petn was addressed by CA8 in its first opinion ordering a 
remand in March 1982; the INS was required to petn for cert from 
that opinion to be timely on the issue raised. Because it waited 
instead to petn from the second CA8 opinion, its petn is JOT. 
This argument is ridiculous. The second CA8 opinion formed the - -basis for the INS's petn, and it was timely filed. The rest of 
the response consists of rehashing what the BIA and CA8 ruled. 
I recommend that you vote to grant. 
L 
November 21, 1984 
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